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Abstract
The EU offers a variety of access points through which interest groups can attempt 
to influence policy-making. In this paper, we analyze differences in the use of these 
access points, or venues, by interest groups. Considering the roles played by differ-
ent EU institutions along the policy cycle, we argue that the venues differ by the 
extent to which they encourage lobbying from different interest groups. Analyzing 
survey responses by more than 700 European interest associations, we find that the 
distribution of access-seeking by business and non-business actors differs across 
venues. Reflecting its pivotal role at the pre-proposal stage, the Commission encour-
ages non-business organizations to spend much of their finite lobbying resources. In 
the context of the European Parliament, non-business groups are not only interested 
in influencing its decisions, but also in connecting to ordinary Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Business groups, for their part, apply greater resources to the rap-
porteurs. Finally, we show that business groups also allocate their resources to regu-
latory agencies at the implementation stage in the policy process, where incomplete 
legislative contracts are finalized and non-business groups’ resources are depleted.
Keywords Business organizations · Venue shopping · Interest groups · European 
Union institutions
Introduction
The European Union (EU), like many Western political systems, is facing a crisis of 
legitimacy. The European model is challenged by Eurosceptic forces (Treib 2014), 
and its problem-solving capacity is regarded as an important precondition to regain 
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the trust of its citizens (De Angelis 2017). Against this background, interest groups, 
especially non-business organizations, get into the spotlight as they might increase 
both the output and input legitimacy of the EU’s political system (Kohler-Koch 
2010). Accessing policy-makers is a precondition for the capability of these organi-
zations to influence policy. Recognizing this, over the past two decades the Euro-
pean Commission (2001) has put extensive efforts into levelling the playing field 
for organized—especially non-business—interests. In this paper, we investigate the 
extent to which these efforts are matched by the access-seeking strategies of interest 
groups.
Access-seeking is part of a strategy of inside lobbying by interest groups attempt-
ing to influence public policy (Bouwen 2004; Hansen 1991). As Truman (1951: 
264) pointed out, access is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to influence 
policies: “Power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group, or its 
leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the government”. 
Apart from cases where policy-makers contact interest groups directly themselves, 
seeking access is a precondition for gaining influence (Schlozman and Tierney 
1986). In respect to state-society relations, it is therefore important to know how 
business and non-business actors differ in their strategies: If business actors wield 
disproportionate power over political outcomes, then political equality and demo-
cratic accountability are undermined (Dahl 1989: 324–328).
For organized groups pursuing insider strategies, the question arises which pol-
icy-making venues they should target. Following Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 32), 
we define policy venues as the institutional locations where authoritative decisions 
are made concerning a given issue. In Brussels, policy-making occurs across a range 
of venues that interest groups can target, obliging them to choose which venues to 
concentrate their lobbying efforts on. In the EU, power is even more dispersed than 
in the highly fragmented political system of the US (Hull 1993: 85). Thus, interest 
groups can target multiple venues to pursue their goals. It is this process of venue 
shopping (Baumgartner and Jones 2009), or venue choice, that we seek to explain 
in respect to both business and non-business organizations. To this end, we analyze 
differences in lobbying behavior across the EU intuitions with their different roles in 
the policy cycle.
Our investigation makes several contributions to the literature on EU politics and 
political advocacy. Firstly, if there are systematic differences between the access 
seeking strategies of business and non-business groups, this might lead to differ-
ential access to political actors and hence affect the opportunities groups have to 
apply influence at a given stage in the process. Specifically, business actors are often 
considered to enjoy privileged access to policy-makers (Knoke et al. 1996; Su et al. 
1995). Secondly, while organizations are relatively free to lobby across venues, the 
opportunities to affect policy outcomes vary between venues. For example, consist-
ent with the literature  on national-level lobbying (Grant 2000; Hall and Wayman 
1990; Richardson and Jordan 1979), lobbying early in the policy-making process 
and trying to influence the Commission at the pre-proposal (consultation) stage, 
is generally considered to be more effective than lobbying at subsequent stages in 
the process (Bouwen 2009; Hull 1993). Thirdly, while existing studies have investi-
gated the strategies of gaining/seeking access at the European level (Hanegraaff and 
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Berkhout 2019; Beyers 2004) or from a multi-level perspective (Ehrlich and Jones 
2017; Kohler-Koch et al. 2017; Dür and Mateo 2016), our research design allows 
us to compare systematically the lobbying efforts of both business and non-business 
organizations at venues pivotal to all stages of the EU policy-making process (pre 
and post legislative). For this purpose, we can use data from an online survey with 
responses from 734 European interest groups on how frequently they sought access 
to a broad range of venues at the EU level. Thus, we can investigate access-seek-
ing strategies at the crucial desk levels of both the Commission (DGs) and Council 
(Coreper); two different venues within the Parliament; and regulatory agencies. The 
latter can be considered to function as supranational agents in order to solve prob-
lems of incomplete contracting in the legislative process (Pollack 1997), in which 
not every detail can be regulated nor every future conflict caused by the law be fore-
seen. In order to analyze if business and non-business groups are more or less likely 
to target a specific venue, we conduct a multivariate analysis for each of the venues. 
In this way we can comprehensively analyze lobbying efforts along the whole policy 
cycle from pre-proposal to the implementation stage.
In addition to comparing the access-seeking strategies of business and non-busi-
ness groups, we can further analyze how the concentration of lobbying effort at one 
venue could affect choices at others. Furthermore, we look at the European Parlia-
ment in a more differentiated way by distinguishing between rapporteurs and ordi-
nary MEPs. In this way, we can qualify and contextualize studies that have found 
that the Parliament is more open to non-business interests (Dür et al. 2019; Lehmann 
2009). Our findings suggest that there is no business advantage at the level of the 
Commission. However, while business and non-business groups actively participate 
during the consultation phase—with the latter benefiting from Commission efforts 
to level the playing field—the effect is to deplete the relatively limited resources of 
non-business actors, thereby advantaging business at subsequent stages of the policy 
process, in particular during implementation by regulatory agencies.
Venue shopping in the multi‑level system of the EU
Interest groups can be broadly categorized as business and other interests 
(Walker 1991). If groups have a comparative advantage in material resources 
compared to their opponents, they are able to develop more appealing interpre-
tations of their positions to policy-makers (Smith 1984: 49). In general, busi-
ness actors possess greater material resources, which increases their chances 
of accessing policy-makers. Moreover, the more resource-rich groups are, the 
larger the number and variety of venues they can target (Holyoke et  al. 2012: 
13). Furthermore, the ability of interest groups to offer useful information con-
cerning policy consequences is a key component of gaining access (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006; Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith 1993). Often technical, such 
information is important to European institutions, especially the European 
Commission, given its relatively low bureaucratic capacities (Broscheid and 
Coen 2003: 167). Technical information is helpful to political actors to decide 
on the details when drafting legislation (Bouwen 2004: 346). Thus, technical 
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knowledge is another important resource business groups possess, and arguably 
one that they avail of to a greater extent than other groups (Bernhagen 2007). 
However, policy-makers also demand political information on public support or 
opposition for a piece of legislation. This holds true especially for the European 
Parliament (Dür et al. 2019; De Bruycker 2016).
Several studies have analyzed groups’ strategies to seek and gain access to 
different venues in the EU from a multi-level perspective (Ehrlich and Jones 
2017; Dür and Mateo 2016; Beyers 2002). They distinguish a national route 
where organizations lobby national-level institutions to influence European pol-
icy-making, and a Brussels route where they directly target actors and institu-
tions at the supranational level. Beyers (2004) analyzes differences in the inside 
lobbying strategies between “specific” and “diffuse” interests in these venues: 
Directorate Generals (DGs) and cabinets of the European Commission, Mem-
bers of the European Parliament (MEPs), advisory bodies—the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—as well as the 
Council (Permanent Representations and the Council secretariat). He defines 
specific interests analogous to Beer’s (1965) “producer groups” (i.e., as busi-
ness associations and trade unions). “Diffuse interests” link broad and general 
segments of society lacking such a specific and concentrated constituency (Bey-
ers 2004: 216). No differences in the inside lobbying strategies of diffuse and 
specific interests are found, with both forms lobbying the European Commis-
sion and Parliament most frequently, and the member-state representatives in 
the Council to a lesser extent. However, while analytically sharp, this classifica-
tion prohibits the possibility of distinguishing between employer and employee 
organizations, since both are producer groups.
The literature on gaining access to policy-makers yields interesting results on 
the success of inside lobbying. Analyzing contacts between organized interests 
and policy-makers in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania and Spain, Dür and 
Mateo (2016) find that business associations at both the European and national 
level have an advantage over other types of associations regarding access to 
executive institutions. However, business groups do not gain significantly more 
access to legislative institutions than other interest groups at the European and 
national level. In a recent study, Hanegraaff and Berkhout (2019) find that the 
distribution among business groups and non-business groups is similar across 
the venues of both the Commission and the European Parliament. Kohler-Koch 
et al. (2017) analyze the access-seeking strategies of national business associa-
tions both to national as well as to European institutions. They find that the more 
financial resources an organization possesses, the more likely it is to gain access 
to an institution. This applies especially to European compared to national insti-
tutions, where it is of less importance. These partly diverging findings underline 
the importance of studying strategies of inside lobbying, i.e., access-seeking. 
Our research design enables us to evaluate these findings regarding strategies of 
inside lobbying by European interest groups to EU institutions, including two 
different venues within the European Parliament. In the next section, we develop 
theoretical expectations about the advocacy strategies of business and non-busi-
ness groups.
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Strategies of inside lobbying
At the European level, a variety of venues provide opportunities for interest 
groups to influence policies (Princen and Kerremans 2008). The process for-
mally begins with the European Commission, which has the sole right to initiate 
legislation. Due to its consultation regime, a wide variety of interests have the 
possibility to influence legislation at this vital pre-legislative stage. In the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, the Parliament and the Council of the EU are both 
veto players whose consent is necessary for legislation to pass. Around 95% of 
laws are now decided under this procedure. The policy-making process continues 
after the legislative procedure is completed. Here the Commission and regulatory 
agencies play a vital role in implementation, with the latter frequently granted 
considerable discretion to manage and reconcile incomplete legislative contracts. 
This leaves interest groups with a range of options to influence the substance of 
these decisions.
To gain influence, groups first need to get access to European level institu-
tions. Since resources are limited, they must decide which European level pol-
icy-makers will be most advantageous for them to target their lobbying effort 
at. This strategic behavior should vary between group types: to the extent that 
business groups command greater resources in general and in particular more rel-
evant technical information, they will expect their access-seeking efforts to be 
more successful compared with other groups. In this paper, we take the unique 
opportunity to analyze differences in access-seeking strategies at venues across 
the whole policy cycle including the implementation stage. In this way, we can 
also draw conclusions on how lobbying efforts at one venue influences choices at 
others.
Research indicates that business actors are generally overrepresented in the 
EU, and in political systems more generally (Rasmussen and Carroll 2014; Eis-
ing 2004; Greenwood 1997). Additionally, business frequently has very special-
ized political interests, for which the highly specialized and technical executive 
and legislative agenda of European institutions provides a congenial environment. 
This offers business actors numerous opportunities for “niche” or “loophole lob-
bying”, concentrating on very specific aspects of a policy with the aim of mini-
mizing the cost implications while at the same time increasing the benefits for 
a specific sector (Polk and Schmutzler 2005). In respect to US policy-making, 
Baumgartner and Leech (2001) have found that business groups are overrepre-
sented in all lobbying activities. Furthermore, almost all policy issues attract lob-
bying by only a very small number of organizations, often only by one. Moreover, 
for these issues triggering the interest of only one or two groups, the lobbyists are 
usually business actors. However, recent research (Dür et al. 2019) has shown that 
business organizations are frequently less successful than non-business organiza-
tions in respect to influencing the policy outputs of the EU.
Furthermore, some institutions are biased toward certain types of interest, 
so that different groups are favored or disadvantaged by different institutional 
arrangements (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). In an early study focusing on the 
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local level, Stone (1976) found that citizen groups are more influential in open, 
public forums held for debating community development policies, while busi-
ness-oriented elites are more likely to get their will in the quieter, more techni-
cal and bureaucratic implementation stages. Similarly, while business groups are 
overrepresented in all main venues in Denmark, they are especially well-equipped 
to get access to the bureaucracy, whereas citizen groups are overrepresented in 
parliament compared to their share in the interest group population (Binderkrantz 
et  al. 2015). In their study on multi-level lobbying, Dür and Mateo (2016) also 
found legislative institutions more prone to listen to non-business interests than 
executive institutions. For interest groups this means that they should target the 
venues that offer them the best opportunities to fulfil their objectives. They expect 
to influence a particular policy more successfully if they manage to change the 
institutional venue where the decision is made (Pralle 2003). Thus, groups should 
target the venues that are most favorable to their goals. As a result, there will be 
differences in the proportion of group types seeking access to a given venue at 
the European level. However, the goals that interest groups pursue in the political 
arena are not limited to influencing political decision making. They also include 
less tangible goals, such as enhanced legitimacy, both of the groups and their 
cause, improved networks and increased political capital (cf. Ruzza 2011, 2015). 
This has implications for the relationship between specific venues and specific 
group types: on the one hand, some venues give interest groups a greater possibil-
ity to pull the substance of a decision into the direction of their preferences than 
others. On the other hand, some access points offer other important goods, like 
democratic legitimacy, representation, and political capital. While non-business 
groups should weigh both goals equally, we expect business groups in general 
to concentrate their resources on the most important decision nodes in the EU. 
These incentives affect the relative allocation of lobbying resources between the 
two group types. In the following, we discuss the implications of this argument 
for each institution in the order of their appearance in the ordinary legislative 
procedure.
European Commission
Organized interests have considerable incentives to target the European Commis-
sion because of its agenda-setting role in the legislative process. Its DGs take care 
of drafting legislation and conducting consultations with organized interests. Fur-
thermore, the Commission plays a decisive role in implementing legislation. This 
dual role makes the Commission an even more important venue, and it is considered 
to be the most promising stage to influence legislation in the EU (Bouwen 2009; 
Hull 1993). For this reason, business interests are also highly overrepresented at this 
stage, even regarding the participation rates in the open stakeholder consultations 
of the Commission (Marxsen 2015; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). Furthermore, in 
order to fulfil its functions and due to its low bureaucratic capabilities, the Commis-
sion is highly dependent on the technical knowledge offered by business associa-
tions and firms (Coen 2009).
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However, as a consequence of its central role in EU policy-making and for reasons 
of legitimacy, the Commission goes to considerable lengths to level the interest group 
playing field, rolling out the metaphorical red carpet to otherwise disadvantaged inter-
ests, in particular facilitating the direct participation of civil society organizations in the 
process (Kohler-Koch 2010; Greenwood 2007; European Commission 2001). While 
the Commission aligned with business interests in the market-creating phase of com-
pleting the single market, it has now an interest to cooperate with civil society organiza-
tions in order to regulate this market (Dür et al. 2019). For this reason, the Commission 
has created its system of open online consultations that facilitates the participation of 
broader segments of the interest groups universe. Increasing politicization of EU poli-
tics could also play a role, as salience is associated with less participation bias in the 
consultations (Roed and Hansen 2018). Furthermore, the Commission directly funds 
and even creates EU interest groups (Coen and Bouwen 2009: 8). While group type 
does not play a role when it comes to the allocation of funds by the Commission (core 
and other funding) (Crepaz and Hanegraaff 2019), it seems likely that only the pro-
vision of ‘core funding’ is decisive for access. Thus, other funding is generally pro-
ject-related and therefore not explicitly associated with building lobbying capacity, for 
example, research and development funding. To illustrate the Commission’s activist 
role, it finances non-governmental organizations (NGOs), sometimes adding a signifi-
cant portion to their overall annual budget as in the case of European Consumer Organ-
ization (BEUC): In 2017, the organization received an operating grant of €1,400,000 
along with other project-related EU funding of €1,034,837, which together represent 
half of its annual budget (BEUC 2018). In the words of Mahoney (2004: 444): “The 
direct role of outright subsidy may be seen as an effort by the EU to promote wider 
civil society participation, working to lessen some of the endemic biases inherent in the 
patterns of mobilization of different sectors of society”. Moreover, as illustrated above, 
the impact  that Commission funding has on smaller, less-well financed non-business 
groups will be larger than the one on business or other already better-funded organiza-
tions. While resources seem to play a role in influencing the agenda setting of the EU 
(Binderkrantz and Rasmussen 2015), the Commission aims at creating a neo pluralistic 
environment, encompassing a wider spectrum of interests than would otherwise have 
been the case. Especially important in this regard is its highly institutionalized consul-
tation regime, which lowers the costs for interest groups to participate in EU policy-
making. As a result, non-business organizations are likely to develop particularly high 
aspirations to lobby the Commission. We expect that these incentives compensate any 
advantage that business might have in terms of material resource and technical knowl-
edge when it comes to lobbying:
Hypothesis 1 Business and non-business groups are equally likely to seek access 
to the Commission.
European Parliament
In the context of the European Parliament, the (shadow-) rapporteurs and 
chairs of committees are the most promising lobbying targets, as they play an 
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important role in formulating the position the institution takes on a piece of leg-
islation (Hix and Hoyland 2011: 58–59; Mahoney 2008). The rapporteur is the 
single most influential actor in the Parliament (Hix and Hoyland 2011; Marshall 
2010). More than a third of all amendments that make it through committee have 
been part of their draft reports (Marshall 2010). As a consequence, rapporteurs 
carefully manage access, since the time they have to talk to interest groups is 
limited. Conversely, ordinary MEPs are less central to the legislative process, 
and they are larger in number. As such, they represent contact points via whom 
an interest group is less likely to influence policies than via the rapporteurs, but 
whose access opportunities are less restricted. Thus, for non-business groups 
approaching ordinary MEPs is a less costly alternative in order to have some 
potential impact on policy-making. Furthermore, these ordinary MEPs provide 
interest groups with the opportunity to connect to parliamentarians and to dem-
onstrate to their members that they are politically active, creating in this way 
incentives for potential members to join the organization (Godwin et  al. 2013: 
95). For their part, MEPs need not only technical, but also political informa-
tion about the level of public support and/or opposition to a policy, which non-
business groups can signal to them because their members and supporters are 
to a large extent identical to the voters (De Bruycker 2016: 600). While rappor-
teurs are also interested in political information, they are occupied with drafting 
amendments to a Commission proposal and thus more in need of technical infor-
mation business groups can supply.
Of course, both business and non-business groups have an interest in influenc-
ing the content of decisions made by EU-level policy-makers. Thus, in respect to 
the European Parliament, there is a strong incentive for both types of groups to 
target the rapporteurs. However, in contrast to the Commission, the Parliament 
has made no institution-wide effort to counterbalance business groups’ resource 
advantage. Moreover, given that the Commission has encouraged non-business 
organizations to direct a considerable portion of resources to the consultation 
stage, these organizations are even less well placed to compete in what is argu-
ably the second most advantageous lobbying target. Furthermore, the incentive 
of non-business groups to lobby the European Parliament might not be as big 
in relation to  business because the directly elected legislative chamber can be 
considered a natural ally of citizen groups (Dür et al. 2019). We finally expect 
non-business groups to also have an interest in connecting to parliamentar-
ians to pursue more diffuse goals, such as being represented in parliamentary 
forums or building political capital. These expectations lead to the following 
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 Business groups are more likely to seek access to rapporteurs than 
non-business groups.
Hypothesis 3 Non-business groups are more likely to seek access to ordinary 
MEPs than business groups.
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Member‑state representatives in the Council of the EU
If groups have not been successful in pulling a legislative proposal into their pre-
ferred direction, addressing member-state representatives may be the last resort to 
prevent or change a legislative proposal. This holds true especially for the influ-
ential national diplomats in Coreper, who oversee all legislative processes within 
the Council and resolve most issues (if agreement has not already been reached in 
the working groups) before they reach the ministers (Häge 2013). Economic and 
other structural interests of the member states play an important role in the deci-
sion-making processes in the Council (Thomson 2011). Moreover, national govern-
ments might be more prone to listen to business, i.e., employer interests, because 
they are important for generating growth and employment and in this way affect the 
re-election chances of governments (Bernhagen 2007). Information on the aggre-
gate needs and interests of businesses in the domestic markets are important in this 
regard (Saurugger 2009; Bouwen 2002). Thus, business groups have an incentive to 
lobby these institutional venues as they are likely to share their preference for main-
taining a frequently market-friendly status quo of EU regulation (Dür et al. 2019). 
However, owing to the same re-election incentive, national governments also have 
to take into consideration other types of interests. Yet, while national governments 
may not discourage the participation of wider societal interests, they do not facilitate 
the participation of non-business groups in the legislative procedure as actively as 
the Commission does. As national diplomats have to take into account the domestic 
constraints of the institution’s top level outlined above, we expect that:
Hypothesis 4 Business groups are more likely to seek access to member-state rep-
resentatives in the Council than non-business groups.
Regulatory lobbying
Decision making at the European level does not stop when the formal legislative 
procedure is concluded. The regulatory agencies of the EU have important compe-
tences in implementing legislative decisions and are also able to make new regula-
tions. They are involved in the implementation of legislation both by assisting the 
Commission and providing technical information to this institution and its imple-
menting bodies as well as by their own competence to adopt regulations (Chiti 
2013). Majone (1997: 264) describes their operation as “information-based modes 
of regulation” which ought to be “in tune with current economic, technological and 
political conditions”. On the one hand, they collaborate closely with the Commis-
sion while retaining a considerable degree of decision-making autonomy (Tron-
dal 2010). On the other hand, they are controlled to a large extent by appointees 
of member states on their management boards (Keleman and Majone 2017). Exist-
ing studies on EU regulatory agencies (Egeberg and Trondal 2011; Barbieri and 
Ongaro 2008; Trondal 2010; Keleman 2002) have not addressed the role played by 
organized interests. One exception is a recent study by Arras and Braun (2018), who 
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analyze stakeholder consultations by European regulatory agencies. These scholars 
find that most regulatory agencies involve stakeholders to a certain degree, including 
by means of public consultations. However, while acknowledging the importance of 
increasing the transparency and legitimacy of decisions, the agencies’ main moti-
vation is to obtain expertise. Thus, Arras and Braun (2018: 1259) point to a pos-
sible dependence of regulators on the regulated industry. Moreover, as they usually 
operate in a single policy area, European regulatory agencies are especially prone to 
niche lobbying (Barbieri and Ongaro 2008: 413).
The literature suggests that business groups are much more likely than non-
business groups to seek access to regulatory agencies, for four reasons. Firstly, only 
groups possessing sufficient amounts of material resources as well as technical 
knowledge of importance to regulatory agencies can address these highly specialized 
actors successfully. Chubb (1983) has shown that producer groups are more likely to 
lobby the bureaucracy than citizen groups, and that resource-rich citizen groups are 
more likely than resource-poor citizen groups to seek access to the bureaucracy. He 
argues that the marginal costs of lobbying increase rapidly at the point where the 
congressional decision process ends and the bureaucratic decision making begins. 
Secondly, business groups are more likely to be affected by the rules set by agen-
cies than other interests. Thirdly, as Dür et al. (2019) have shown, business is more 
likely to lose in the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure. This provides business 
actors with increased incentives to target their efforts at the implementation stage. 
Moreover, the US literature has found a business advantage both regarding access to 
federal agencies as well as in influencing their decisions (McKay and Yackee 2007; 
Yackee and Yackee 2006; Golden 1998). Regulatory agencies are especially likely 
to act in accordance with submissions from interest groups if the latter request to 
keep the rules as is. Golden (1998) has found that, when a commenter requested that 
the agency keep a rule the same, it accommodated this request in 94 per cent of all 
cases. Thus, regulatory agencies in the US tend to concede to the wishes of busi-
ness groups (Yackee 2006) and, when lobbied, have a bias in favor of the status quo. 
We argue that this logic extends to the case of the EU. Furthermore, a consequence 
of the Commission’s actions in providing incentives for non-business to favor its 
venues when allocating resources is that, at the regulatory stage in the process, non-
business groups will have depleted resources. Because regulatory agencies provide 
such a fertile ground for the efforts of business lobbyists, we expect that
Hypothesis 5 Business groups are more likely to seek access to European regula-
tory agencies than non-business groups.
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Research design
To analyze the patterns and determinants of inside lobbying strategies, we use an 
original survey data set on EU-level interest groups. In the web-based INTEREURO 
Interest Group Survey  (Beyers et  al. 2015), we targeted EU-level interest groups 
(both EU peak associations and national organizations with a presence in Brussels) 
that show at least a minimum degree of interest in EU policy-making processes. To 
demarcate the EU interest group population, we used the EU’s Transparency regis-
ter,1 the OECKL Directory (2014)2 and lists of actors identified in issue-centered 
research reported in Beyers et al. (2014). In this way, we aimed at getting a complete 
picture of the EU interest group universe, instead of relying on one source only (e.g., 
the Transparency Register). The study focuses on interest associations; individual 
firms have not been included in the sample. The result yielded a sample of 2038 
interest groups, which were invited to take part in the survey. The questionnaire was 
in the field from 9 March until 2 July 2015. 734 questionnaires have been completed, 
leading to a response rate of 36 per cent. The distribution of these groups is almost 
evenly split between business (52.7%) and other groups (47.3%).
Dependent variable: access seeking
The dependent variable is the frequency with which groups have sought access to 
each major EU institution. The precise wording of the survey question is: “During 
the last 12 months, how often has your group actively sought access to the following 
EU-level institutions and agencies in order to influence public policies?” Respond-
ents could choose between the following categories: “We did not seek access”, “At 
least once”, “At least once every three months”, “At least once a month”, “At least 
once a week”. These categories have been assigned integers from 1 (“did not seek 
access”) to 5 (“At least once a week”). Using this scale, the frequency of access 
has been probed for five different institutional actors in four venues at the EU level, 
which include the three main legislative institutions, the Commission, Council and 
Parliament, as well as European regulatory agencies. Regarding the Commission, 
we can analyze access seeking strategies at the crucial desk level (DGs). We dis-
tinguish between two different venues in the European Parliament: the (shadow-) 
rapporteurs and ordinary MEPs. In the Council, we look at lobbying efforts aimed 
at diplomats in Coreper, since these play an important role in shaping the outcome 
of the policy-making process. Finally, we investigate access-seeking to regulatory 
agencies, which are an important access point to affect policy implementation. Thus, 
our analysis will use five different dependent variables.
1 Transparency Register, available at: http://ec.europ a.eu/trans paren cyreg ister /publi c/homeP age.do?local 
e=en#en, accessed 16 October 2014.
2 OECKL. Directory of Public Affairs—Europe and International Alliances 2014/2015, 19th edition,
 Wien: Festland Verlag.
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Explanatory and control variables
The main explanatory variable in this analysis is group type. It is coded 1 for busi-
ness and 0 for other groups. Coding was carried out by two student assistants. After 
a period of training in order to check and improve the intercoder reliability, both 
coded 100 organizations independently of each other. Krippendorff’s alpha for these 
100 observations was 0.93. From then onward, each coder coded a part of the sam-
ple independently, but they discussed cases in which they were uncertain whether 
a group belongs to the business or non-business category. Fourteen cases which 
they could not agree on were decided by a researcher. Professional associations 
were coded according to the status of their members as business or non-business. 
If members are mostly employees, the professional organization was coded as non-
business, as this kind of professional associations is similar to “white collar” unions 
(c.f. Kjellberg 2013). If most of the members are self-employed, the organization 
was coded as business.
Group type is not the only variable that explains variation in access seeking to 
different venues in the multi-level system of the EU. Therefore, a number of control 
variables from the survey will be used in the analysis. Regardless of whether an 
organization represents business or non-business interests, its level of Europeaniza-
tion should play a role in its lobbying strategy. This should hold especially regarding 
the European Commission, as this institution fosters the Europeanization of inter-
est groups. Bouwen (2004) has found that European associations enjoy the highest 
degree of access to the Commission. Furthermore, groups do not only have the pos-
sibility to target different venues at the European level to influence public policies. 
Alternatively, they can use the national route (Beyers 2002). The more time groups 
spend at the European level, the more likely they are also to actively seek access to 
the supranational institutions. The percentage of time an interest group spends at the 
European level relative to both the regional and international/global level will be 
used as an indicator for the degree of Europeanization of a group.
Beside time constraints, the amount of resources spent at the EU-level constrains 
the inside lobbying strategies of groups. Thus, the percentage of the total resources 
of the organization that is spent focusing on EU policies is added as a control vari-
able to the analysis. It consists of four categories: “Less than 25%”, “Between 25 
and 50%”, “Between 50 and 75%”, and “More than 75%”, coded 1–4. Furthermore, 
the more time a group devotes to insider strategies, the more frequently it should 
actively seek access to EU institutions. Thus, the percentage of time a group spends 
on insider, in relation to outsider strategies, has been added as a control variable. 
The question reads as follows: “Approximately what percentage of your organiza-
tion’s time is devoted to insider strategies that involve activities such as direct con-
tact with the Commission, member state representatives or policy officials in the 
European Parliament AND outsider strategies that involve press releases, coordinat-
ing letter writing, e-mailing or social media campaigns, rallies and demonstrations?” 
Respondents were asked to write approximate percentages for insider and outsider 
strategies into two separate fields in the web form.
The age of an organization is an indicator for its stability, credibility, success and 
the quality of its network. Organizations that have a history of active involvement 
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in the relevant policy community are more likely to have established networks with 
other groups and policy-makers (Mahoney 2004: 452). Next, insider strategies are 
conditioned by a groups’ overall resource base. The more material resources a group 
possesses, the more it can target different venues at the European level (Ehrlich and 
Jones 2017: 13). We use the budget variable of the survey, which has six categories 
(in €): Under 100,000; 100,000–500,000; 500,000–1 million; 1 million–5 million; 
5 million–10 million; over 10 million. Lastly, technical information is an important 
resource that EU institutions demand, especially due to their own limited bureau-
cratic resources. The survey contains a question asking respondents how often their 
organization had presented research results or technical information to EU-level pol-
icy-makers during the last 12 months. The response categories are “We did not do 
this”, “At least once”, “At least once every 3 months”, “At least once a month”, “At 
least once a week”. Table 1 lists summary statistics for all variables.
Results
Given the nature of the dependent variables, we conduct our multivariate analysis 
using ordered logistic regression. This is done separately for each of the five EU-
level venues that we have developed expectations for.3 The results are presented in 
Table 2, which reports exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). As indicated by rea-
sonably high Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2s, all models predict access seeking rather well.
Table 1  Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Access: Commission DGs 659 1 3 5
Access: (Shadow) Rapporteur 639 1 2 5
Access: Ordinary MEP 646 1 2 5
Access: Coreper 639 1 1 5
Access: Regulatory Agency 640 1 1 5
Business Actor 887  0.53  0.5 0 1 1
Insider Outsider 612 59.99 25.02 0 60 100
Percent EU Lobbying 706 64.93 1.11 0 70 100
Technical Information 639 1 2 5
Percent EU resources 695 1 3 5
Budget 728 1 2 6
Age of organization 864 27.76 25.82 0 21 183
3 We have performed Brant tests (Brant 1990) for all models and the parallel regression assumption 
always holds.
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European Commission
Our theoretical approach assumes that the Commission occupies a unique role in 
structuring the nature of its interactions with interest groups. We have argued that 
a consequence of Commission actions to level the playing field for interest group 
access would be that non-business groups develop aspirations to lobby the Com-
mission on a par with business. Therefore, there should be no observable difference 
between business and non-business behavior (Hypothesis 1). To assess this expecta-
tion, we analyze access to Commission DGs (Model 1) and regress on the group 
type variable. The results lend support to our argument, as we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between business and non-business lobbying at the level 
of the Commission.4
Table 2  Predicting access sought by interest groups, by EU venue
Cell entries are exponentiated coefficients; with standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 




















































































Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2 0.73 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.53
N 533 524 526 522 524
4 It is strictly speaking not possible to conclude that there is no effect when p > α, as the test might sim-
ply have lacked the statistical power to detect a true effect. Given our sample size of n = 533, we expect 
that the lack of a statistically significant difference between business and non-business groups implies 
statistical support to Hypothesis 1, according to which the difference between business and non-business 
groups is zero. To check whether this is the case, we have performed an additional test of equivalence, 
with the null hypothesis that business and non-business groups are different by at least as much as an 
equivalence interval defined a level of tolerance. Formally,  H0: |bbusiness| ≥  Δ, where the equivalence 
interval ranges from  bbusiness − Δ to  bbusiness + Δ. This translates directly into two one-sided null hypoth-
eses:  H01: Δ -  bbusiness ≤ 0; and H02: Δ *  bbusiness ≤ 0. Specifying reasonable upper and lower equivalence 
bounds for the odds ratio of  bbusiness at 0.737 (lower) and 1.731 upper, we can reject the null hypothesis of 
difference at a level of significance of p < 0.5. Thus, we can conclude equivalence and formally infer that 
business and non-business organizations are equally likely to seek access to the Commission.
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The results presented in Model 1 also serve to complete the picture of how DGs 
structure the nature of their interactions with organized interests. Here, the positive 
and significant effect of the ‘insider/outsider’ variable indicates that above all other 
venues it is the Commission that privileges organizations that commit to an insider 
strategy; a behavior associated with an institutionalized form of policy-making. For 
all other venues the effect of this variable is insignificant. A similar sense of the 
Commission as a venue for organizations committed to the supranational path is 
picked up with the ‘percent EU lobbying’ variable, as those organizations that are 
most strongly focused on EU-level lobbying are more likely to direct their lobby-
ing efforts to the Commission. The character of lobbying DGs is further differen-
tiated from all other EU venues with respect to the role of technical information. 
Reassuringly, in keeping with the literature, we find that, ‘technical information’ is 
positively associated with seeking access to all venues. But interestingly in the case 
of the Commission this effect is close to double that for any other venue, suggest-
ing that this requirement is most advantageous at the agenda-setting phase; with a 1 
point (out of 5) increase in the reported frequency of presenting technical knowledge 
associated with a 215% increase in the odds of a higher intention to lobby (moving 
up the 5-point scale) the Commission.
European Parliament
To test the contrasting expectations for business groups’ lobbying in the European 
Parliament, we estimate Models 2 ((Shadow) Rapporteurs) and 3 (ordinary MEPs). 
With respect to the rapporteurs we find that, in support of Hypothesis 2, business 
groups are associated with a 48% increase in the odds of being in a category of 
more frequent lobbying than that selected by non-business groups. Conversely, the 
odds of business groups lobbying ordinary MEPs at a higher level than non-busi-
ness groups are estimated to be 31% lower (all significant at the 0.05 level), lend-
ing considerable support to Hypothesis 3. Thus, while business groups concentrate 
their efforts on influencing the decisions of the Parliament, non-business interests 
have a higher intention to build political capital by connecting as well to ordinary 
parliamentarians.
Member state representatives in the Council of the EU
The expectation for the Council is that business groups lobby national diplomats 
in Coreper more frequently than non-business groups (Hypothesis 4). However, the 
results presented in Model 4 do not support this argument, as the group type variable 
is not significant. Interestingly, the model yields some intuitive results in respect to 
the percentage of EU lobbying. Here the exponentiated coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.5) and smaller than 1, indicating that this EU venue favors lobbying 
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from associations that are predominantly active at the national level. Furthermore, 
organizational age is positively associated with seeking access to this venue. This 
might be due to the fact that—at least at the national level with established interest 
group systems—the age of an organization is considered to be an indicator for its 
credibility.
Regulatory lobbying
To assess the argument that business groups seek to mitigate losses from the legisla-
tive phase of the policy process by pursuing a strategy of access-seeking to Euro-
pean regulatory agencies (hypotheses 5), the final model (5) is considered. Here, 
the exponentiated coefficient for business is significant and in the expected direc-
tion. This indicates that business groups, when compared to non-business groups, 
are associated with a 128% increase in their odds of seeking to lobby regulatory 
agencies.
Finally, across all models we also controlled for the ‘age of organization’, the size 
of its ‘budget’ and the percentage of ‘resources spent at the EU level’. We found 
that, in keeping with the literature, increases in organizations’ financial resources 
are positively associated with their intention to lobby. Furthermore, in all models, 
spending a larger share of resources at the EU level is positively related to the lob-
bying efforts of interest groups across venues. However, organizational age appears 
to be only sporadically associated with access-seeking. Credibility could explain the 
positive effect of organizational age on the intention to lobbying the Council. How-
ever, when it comes to lobbying at the EU level, the supranational institutions also 
have an incentive to cooperate with European associations, which are younger than 
their national counterparts. Table 3 gives an overview of the results in the light of 
our hypotheses.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the access-seeking strategies of interest groups at 
the EU’s key policy-making venues. Drawing on insights from the literatures on 
business lobbying, venue shopping and elite pluralism, we developed a theoretical 
Table 3  Overview of results
Hypothesis Supported
Commission: Similar Likelihood Of Access-Seeking By Business And Non-Business 
Groups (H1)
Yes
Parliament: Business groups are more likely to seek access to rapporteurs (H2) Yes
Non-business groups are more likely to seek access to ordinary MEPs (H3) Yes
Council: Business groups are more likely to seek access (H4) No
Regulatory Agencies: Business groups are more likely to seek access (H5) Yes
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argument and testable hypotheses to account for differences and similarities in the 
extent to which interest groups seek access to the main EU policy-making venues. 
Thereby, our analysis contributes to the understanding of strategies of inside lobby-
ing by different types of interest group at venues involved in all stages of the policy-
making process in the EU and within two different venues in the European Parlia-
ment. Our results yield insights regarding state-society relations in a broader sense, 
and, in particular, an often-expected business bias in the accessibility of European 
institutions.
In our argument we have paid particular attention to the consequences of the 
Commission’s actions to draw non-business interests into the consultation phase 
of the process. Our expectations regarding access-seeking to the European Com-
mission have been supported. The institution seems to have been successful in its 
attempts to neutralize business dominance by creating a neo pluralistic environment 
that is targeted by both business and non-business groups in a broadly equal manner. 
This leads to similar frequencies of inside lobbying pursued by business and non-
business groups regarding this institution. Considering how important the position 
of the Commission is in EU policy-making, this is a noteworthy finding. The institu-
tion is often criticized for heavily relying on the expertise of interest groups because 
of its own low bureaucratic capacities. However, the Commission also seems to be 
successful regarding its efforts to encourage the broader civil society to contribute to 
the deliberations on its legislative initiatives.
Furthermore, our argument that business groups have relatively higher incentives 
to seek access to the rapporteurs in the European Parliament in order to influence 
legislation, while non-business groups are relatively more interested in connecting 
to parliamentarians in order to represent their members and build political capital 
is supported: Business groups lobby rapporteurs more frequently than non-business 
groups, and non-business groups lobby ordinary MEPs more frequently than busi-
ness groups. These results support the argument that non-business groups’ proclivity 
to target ordinary MEPs reflects the need of satisfying their members, while business 
groups are more firmly focused on attempting to secure legislative gains. The finding 
might reflect the fact that accessing ordinary MEPs is less costly than lobbying the 
rapporteurs. While non-business interests have already spent much of their resources 
at the Commission stage, at the stage of the European Parliament decision-making 
resource-endowed business groups can still afford to target rapporteurs. Thus, in dif-
ferentiating between what are likely to be the most and least influential actors within 
the Parliament, we obtain a more comprehensive picture of the accessibility of one 
of the EU’s main legislative bodies. In this way, we have to qualify previous findings 
of equal access to the European Parliament for business and non-business interests 
(e.g., Dür and Mateo 2016). However, while business groups might provide the Par-
liament with important technical knowledge it needs to compete with the other two 
legislative institutions, so far these lobbying efforts do not seem to have biased the 
legislative body in favor of business interests (Dür et  al. 2019). Furthermore, we 
have found no support for our expectation that business groups lobby the representa-
tives of member states in the Council more frequently than other interests. Hence, 
the Council, like the Commission, seems to be open to a broad range of interests 
and is not as biased toward business as is often expected. This might imply that 
 D. Pakull et al.
national representatives structure access in such a way as to demonstrate that differ-
ent nationally derived policy perspectives are taken into account. Re-election incen-
tives at the top level of this institution might be important even for the diplomats 
structuring their interactions with interest groups given the Council members’ ties 
to their national constituents. From the perspective of state-society relations and the 
democratic quality of EU policy-making, this finding is as encouraging as the simi-
larities in access-seeking to the Commission by business and non-business actors.
Finally, our study provides new insights into regulatory lobbying in the EU. 
There is strong evidence to suggest that business groups attempt to mitigate any 
losses they might have incurred during the legislative phase, as they are more likely 
to lobby regulatory agencies than are non-business groups. Moreover, the lower 
non-business activity found at regulatory agencies corresponds with our argument 
that after responding to the Commission’s selective incentives these organizations 
simply lack the resources to engage in lobbying at this final venue. Non-business 
groups might also be less affected by, and thus to a lesser extent interested in chang-
ing, the highly specific decisions of these institutions than business groups lobbying 
more frequently in the niches of policy-making. In sum, while there is no evidence 
of a business bias of the European Commission at the starting point of the EU’s 
legislative process, business groups might be able to pull the outcome back in their 
preferred direction toward the end of the process. However, it is doubtful that this 
can fully compensate for any previous legislative losses. Further studying the differ-
ences between business and non-business groups’ access to EU regulatory agencies 
as well as influencing their decisions would be a promising field of research.
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